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NOTE
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax
Board: California's Three-Factor Apportionment
Formula for Taxing U.S. Corporations'
Foreign Subsidiaries Held Constitutional
In Container Corporation of Amertca v. Franchise Tax Board,' the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 2 of California's corporate franchise tax, which utilizes a three-factor apportionment formula of
4
payroll, property, and sales 3 along with the unitary business principle,
to tax the income of U.S. corporations' fully-integrated 5 foreign subsidi-

I -U.S.
523).

-,

103 S. Ct. 2933, reh'g denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1983) (No. 81-

2 The tax was attacked for due process and commerce clause violations.
3 CAL. REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE § 25101 (West 1979) provides as follows:
Derivation from domestic and foreign sources; measure of tax; apportionment
When the income of a taxpayer subject to the tax imposed under this part is
derived from or attributable to sources both within and without the state the tax
shall be measured by the net income derived from or attributable to sources
within this state in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 (commencing with
Section 25210 of this chapter); provided, however, that any method of apportionment shall take into account as income derived from or attributable to sources
without the state, income derived from or attributable to transportation by sea or
air without the state, whether or not such transportation is located in or subject to
the jurisdiction of any other state, the United States or any foreign country.
If the Franchise Tax Board reapportions net income upon its examination of
any return, it shall, upon the written request of the taxpayer, disclose to it the
basis upon which its reapportionment has been made.
Other relevant statutes are as follows:
Property factor
The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the average value
of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used in
this state during the income year and the denominator of which is the average
value of all the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented
and used during the income year. Id. § 25129.
Payroll factor
The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total amount
paid in this state during the income year by the taxpayer for compensation, and
the denominator of which is the total compensation paid everywhere during the
income year. Id. § 25129.
Sales factor
The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales of the
taxpayer in this state during the income year, and the denominator of which is
the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the income year. Id. § 25129.
4 See inf/ra notes 120-55 and accompanying text.
5 A fully-integrated business is one that does not look to outside sources for supplies,
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aries. The formula was upheld despite the fact that it resulted in multiple taxation. 6 The decision, although necessitated by the dearth of
uniform legislation 7 in this area, may not only result in a state taxing and
receiving more than its fair share of revenue, but it also ignores the fact
that foreign governments are concerned about the divergence in state
taxing formulas affecting foreign commerce and may take retaliatory
8
measures.
Container, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, is engaged in the production and distribution of paperboard packaging materials. 9 Its operations include producing paperboard out of
raw timber and wastepaper, and converting the paperboard into finished
products.10 During the 1963, 1964 and 1965 tax years, Container controlled twenty foreign subsidiaries located in Latin America and Western
Europe.II Its interest in the subsidiaries ranged from 66.75 percent to
100 percent,' 2 with the percentage not owned by Container owned by
local nationals. All of the subsidiaries, 13 except one, 1 4 were engaged in
the paperboard packaging business.
Container and its subsidiaries were fully integrated except for some
outside purchasing of paperboard and other products.' 5 Container
purchased no materials from the subsidiaries and did not engage in joint
marketing efforts with them. 16 Purchases of materials from Container by
the subsidiaries accounted for about one percent of the subsidiaries' total
purchases. 17 The subsidiaries were essentially managed in the same
manner as Container's U.S. operations. Container operated under a policy of decentralization using regional vice-presidents.' 8 Each of the foreign subsidiaries employed a senior vice-president and four officers from
the local citizenry.' 9 If this arrangement was unfeasible, Container assigned personnel to the subsidiaries. 20 Container's employees had no formal training but some of the foreign employees spent two to six weeks in
materials, or assistance in manufacturing its product. For example, a corporation may grow the
trees it uses to make paper products. Some of its employees will then cut down the trees. The
lumber will then be treated and turned into paper products at the corporation's own plants.
6 California's formula taxed Container on income that had already been taxed to
Container's subsidiaries by the foreign governments where the subsidiaries were located.
7 See in/fa notes 156-80 and accompanying text.
8 See infa notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
9 103 S. Ct. at 2943.
10 Id.
Id
12 Id
13 One of these subsidiaries was inactive.
14 This subsidiary acted as a holding company.
15 103 S. Ct. at 2943.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id at 2944. Container's first foreign subsidiary was established in Columbia in 1944.
19 Id
20 Id
Container encouraged self-reliance by its subsidiaries and practiced a "hands-off
attitude" toward the management of the subsidiaries because they sought to emphasize local
responsibility and accountability, to appeal to local customers and governments, and to take
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U.S. operations. 2 '
the United States familiarizing themselves with the 22
These trips were financed by the foreign subsidiaries.
Day-to-day management of the subsidiaries was handled by the local executives, although any important decisions were reviewed by
Container's management. 23 Container was represented on the board of

directors of most of the subsidiaries, 24 and provided the subsidiaries with
technical advice concerning manufacturing techniques, engineering, design, architecture, insurance, and cost accounting. 25 On occasion,
Container also sold used equipment to the subsidiaries, or employed its

26
purchasing department to act as an agent for the subsidiaries.
During the years in question, Container made loans to the subsidiaries of $7,704,987, $7,155,714, and $3,223,371.27 The subsidiaries furnished Container with budget information and financial data on a
regular basis, and although their tax returns were prepared locally, the
same accounting firm used by Container for its audits also audited most
28

of the subsidiaries.
Container filed California franchise tax returns for the years at issue

but did not include any of the subsidiaries' income.2 9 It calculated the
portion of its payroll, property, and sales taxable under California's statutory three-factor formula, 30 but omitted any of the payroll, property, or
3
sales of its subsidiaries. i
The Franchise Tax Board (FTB) issued notices of deficiency to

Container, alleging that its foreign subsidiaries were part of its unitary
advantage of the fact that the packaging industry is highly sensitive to the differing consumer
habits of different nations. 103 S. Ct. at 2944 & n.8.
During the years at issue, 38 of Container's 13,400 employees were assigned to foreign
subsidiaries. These employees were maintained on Container's payroll. Some employees were
transferred to the foreign subsidiaries and placed on the payroll of the foreign subsidiary. Some
transferred employees continued to draw some pay and fringe benefits from Container.
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 988, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123
(1979).
21 103 S. Ct. at 2944.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id This advice was given either informally, or by entering into technical service
agreements.
26 Id.
27 Id. Container also guaranteed one-third of the subsidiaries' loans from outside sources.
28 Id.
29 Id
30 California's statutory formula is detailed supra at note 3.
31 Container's calculations of its income were as follows:
1963

1964

1965

$26,870,427.00 $28,774,320.48 $32,280,842.00
Total income of unitary business
9.8%
10.6422%
11.041%
Percentage attributed to Calif.
3,174,368.00
3,062,220.73
2,966,763.85
Amount attributed to Calif.
174,590.00
168,422.14
163,172.01
Tax (5.5%)
103 S. Ct. at 2945 & n.1l.
The Franchise Tax Board alleged that Container's actual tax liability was as follows:
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business and not a passive investment.3 2 According to the FTB,
Container had neglected to report its subsidiaries' income, which
33
wrongly decreased the portion of its income attributable to California.
Container paid the deficiency under protest and sued in California Superior Court for a refund. The court upheld the assessment, and the deci34
sion was affirmed on appeal.
Before the United States Supreme Court, Container argued that the
California Court of Appeals utilized a different legal standard in its analysis than the standard that had been articulated by the Supreme
Court. 35 Container contended that the state court improperly relied
upon Container's "mere potential' 36 to control its subsidiaries as a crucial
factor in its determination that it constituted a unitary business.3 7 It
further argued that the state court erred in presuming that subsidiary
corporations involved in the same line of business constitute a unitary
business.38 Container argued that a prerequisite to finding that a corporation is a unitary business is a finding that a substantial flow of goods
exists between the corporate entities. 39 Morever, according to Container,
California's three-factor apportionment formula was distorted due to
lower costs of production in the foreign countries where Container's subsidiaries were located, which resulted in an unfair apportionment of income to California, a violation of due process. 4° Finally, Container
alleged that California's tax was violative of the Commerce Clause because it resulted in multiple taxation in fact, 4 1 taxing income from sub1963

1964

1965

Total income of unitary business
$37,348,183.00 $44,245,879.00 $46,884,966.00
Percentage attributed to Calif.
8.6886%
8.3135%
7.65%
Amount attributed to Calif.
3,245,034.23
3,673,381.15
3,588,012.00
Tax (5.5%)
178,476.88
202,310.95
197,340.00
32 103 S. Ct. at 2945. If a subsidiary is held by a corporation as a passive investment then
it is not part of the corporation's unitary business. &e Keesling and Warren, The Unitary Concept
In the Allocation ofIncome, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42 (1960).
33 d
34 The California Supreme Court refused to grant discretionary review. The United States
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 456 U.S.
960 (1982).
35 103 S. Ct. at 2946.
36 Id Container's argument here is taken from F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and
Revenue Dept. of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 355, 363 (1982). See infdanotes 141-53 and accompanying text. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected a state court's finding that a corporation
was a unitary business. The Court said that the state court's decision was based upon the taxpayer's potential relationship with its subsidiaries, and not upon actual facts that demonstrated
interdependence between the parent corporation and its subsidiaries.
37 103 S. Ct. at 2946.
38 Id. at 2947.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 2948. Container presented evidence that wage rates and other production costs
were lower in the foreign countries. Brief for Appellant 12. Container also presented evidence
that its subsidiaries operated under a greater profit margin than it did. Brief for Appellant 14.
41 Brief for Appellant 21-26. This is in contrast to the mere threat of multiple taxation
which the Supreme Court is more apt to tolerate. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451-52 (1979).
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sidiaries that was also taxed by foreign governments, and because it

prevented the U.S. Government from acting uniformly in matters affect42

ing international affairs.
The Court summarily rejected Container's contention that an improper legal standard was applied by the state court, asserting that the
state court relied principally on evidence detailing the management rela43
tionship between Container and its subsidiaries in reaching its decision.
The Court also quickly dismissed Container's argument that the state
court erred in its presumption that corporations engaged in the same line
of business constitute a unitary business, 44 although it hastened to point
out that this presumption 45 was only one of many factors which
prompted the state court's decision. 46 The Court was similarly unreceptive to Container's premise that a flow of goods was needed for the state

court to find a unitary business. 4 7 The proper prerequisite to a finding of
a unitary business was not a flow of goods, admonished the Court, but a
flow of value 48
value.

meaning goods, or any number of items representing

The Court addressed Container's constitutional challenges to California's three-factor formula in greater detail. 49 It rejected Container's
argument that California's formula violated due process by distorting the
true allocation of income between Container and its subsidiaries, result-

ing in a misalloction of income to California. 50 The Court criticized
Container's use of arms-length, separate accounting principles to arrive
at this argument, reasoning that separate accounting fails to account for
benefits received by Container as a unitary business. 5t The Court voiced
Brief for Appellant 27.
103 S. Ct. at 2946.
Id. at 2947.
However, the Court argued that this presumption was a "reasonable" one since a corporation that enlists subsidiaries in its same line of business is "likely to make better use - either
through economies of scale or through operational integration or sharing of expertise - of the
parent's existing business-related resources."
46 Id. The state court was presented with detailed evidence of the interaction between
Container and its subsidiaries including loans, loan guarantees, assistance in obtaining new and
used equipment, assistance in filling personnel needs, and other technical assistance. See the
Court's discussion, 103 S. Ct. at 2947, and the factual summary infta at notes 15-28 and accompanying text.
47 103 S. Ct. at 2947.
48 Id. The Court sought evidence of the interdependence among the parent and its subsidiaries. This interdependence was represented by functional integration, economies of scale, and
ceniralization of management. These factors contributed to Container's income and could not
be sourced to any one corporation. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of
New Mexico, 458 U.S. 355 (1982). The Court noted that some scholars have suggested that a
flow of goods would be a proper test for a unitary business. 103 S. Ct. at 2947 n. 17 and material
cited therein. But the Court rejected this viewpoint.
49 The Court prefaced its discussion at this point with a reminder that the taxpayer carries
the burden of proving that the income attributed to the state does not bear a rational relationship to the interstate value of the corporation. 103 S. Ct. at 2948.
5 Id
51 Id at 2948-49. The Court argued that separate accounting was theoretically weak and
was not useful with a unitary business because the benefits received from functional integration,
42
43
44
45
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its approval of formula apportionment over separate accounting based
upon the wide acceptance that formula apportionment has received from
state taxing authorities, and noted its belief that California's formula of
"payroll, property, and sales appear in combination to reflect a very
'52
large share of the activities by which value is generated.
Finally, in addressing Container's allegations that California's tax
scheme violated the Commerce Clause, the Court compared the instant
case to an earlier tax case involving foreign commerce, Japan Line, Lid v.
County of Los Angeles. 53 In Japan Litne, the Court rejected California's at54
tempts to place a fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory ad valorem
55
in California, 56
property tax on cargo containers temporarily present
holding that the tax was unconstitutional because it resulted in multiple
taxation of instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce 5 7 and because
it violated the policy of the U.S. Government to speak with one voice in
regulating foreign trade. 58 The Court admitted that Container, like the
taxpayer in Japan Line, was subject to double taxation, 59 and that the
double tax in both cases was due to the divergence of the California taxeconomies of scale, and centralization of management could not be properly accounted for.
The Court said such benefits were incapable of being sourced to a particular location and sourcing is precisely how separate accounting allocates income. See 103 S.Ct. at 2948-49 (quoting
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Texas of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980)).
52 103 S.Ct. at 2949. The Court admitted that formula apportionment had its imperfections in that the weight given to the various factors was arbitrary. Id at n.20. It reasoned,
however, that the margin of error in formula apportionment was not so great compared to
Container's result using separate accounting as to require the court to force California to adopt
a different method of taxation. Id at 2949-50. The California method represented only a 14%
increase over the amount arrived at by separate accounting (or about $72,000). Id.at 2950 and
tables at 2945 & nn. 11-12. The Court stated that this was a "far cry" from the 250% difference
that prompted them to strike down the state tax in Han Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283
U.S. 123 (1931). 103 S. Ct. at 2950.
53 444 U.S. 434 (1979). Japan Line has been the subject of much discussion and critical
comment. See, e.g., Note, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, The Foreign Commerce
Clause.- An Economic Approach to the Negative Effects of State Taxation, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 793
(1980); Note, Constitutional Law The Scope of the Commerce Clause in International Commerce -

Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), 55 WASH. L. REV. 885 (1980);
Note, Taxation - State Property Taxation oflapanese Shipping Cargo Containers Used Exclusively in
Foreign Commerce and Belonging to Companies Based, Registered and Fully Taxed in Japan, is Unconstitu-

tional Under the Commerce Clause: Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 15
TEX. INT'L L.J. 213 (1980); Note, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434
(1979), 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. 319 (1980); Note, ConstitutionalLaw - State Taxation of Foreign Commerce - A State Tax, Although Consistent With Commerce Clause Requirementsfor Interstate Commerce,
May not Be Applied Uniaterallyto Foreign Commerce: Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 47

U.S.L.W. 4477 (U.S. April 30, 1979) (No. 77-1378), 45 J. AIR L. CoM. 559 (1980).
54 An ad valorem property tax is a tax of a fixed percentage of the value of the property to
be taxed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (5th ed. 1981).

55 The containers averaged a stay in California of less than three weeks. Agreed Statement in Lieu of Clerk's and Reporters Transcripts 29, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
56 Id.

57 The Court in ContainersaidjapanLine left open the question of the taxation of "domestically owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce," 103 S.Ct. at 2952 (quoting Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 444 n.7), which the Court felt included the situation in Container.
5 441 U.S. at 453-54.
59 103 S. Ct. at 2951.
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ing scheme and that of foreign taxing authorities. 6° Moreover, there was
evidence that the method of taxation adopted by the foreign authorities
was consistent with accepted international practice, as it had been in
Japan Line. 6 1 The Court argued, however, that there were several important distinctions betweenJapan Line and Container. Unlike the taxpayer
62
in Japan Line, Container was being taxed on income, not property.
Also, the Court viewed the multiple taxation of Container as not an inevitable result of California's taxing scheme, while in Japan Line there was
64
of necessity 63 double taxation.
As to whether their decision would have an impact on federal uniformity, or damage U.S. international trade relations, the Court found
no threat of danger. 65 It noted that Container involved the taxation of a
corporation domiciled and headquartered in the United States, whileJapan Line involved a direct tax on an instrumentality of foreign commerce
owned by foreign merchants. 66 Hence, the Court stated, the real impact
of the tax would be felt by Container as a domestic corporation and not
by the foreign corporations. 6 7 Also, according to the Court, there were
no other indications 68 that the tax on Container was offensive to U.S.
foreign policy. 69 Thus, the judgment of the California Court of Appeals
was affirmed.
The right to levy taxes upon their constituents is reserved to the
60 Id at 2951-52.
61 Id at 2952.
62 Id. The Court stated that the reasons for careful allocation to the proper situs carried
less weight with income than with property tax. Id. (citing Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 445). The
Court analogized the allocation of income to the proper situs to "slicing a shadow" and refused
to force California to adopt a method of taxation that might also lead to double taxation. 103
S. Ct. at 2954.
63 The Court said multiple taxation was inevitable in Japan Lint because Japan claimed
the right to tax the container in full, while California claimed the right to tax the container in
part.
64 103 S. Ct. at 2952.
65 Id. at 2955-57.
66 Id. at 2952.

67 Id. at 2955-56. The Court did not view retaliation by foreign nations through the creation of taxation schemes detrimental to U.S. corporations as a real threat.
68 The Court considered the fact that the Solicitor General did not file an amicus curiae
brief in opposition to the tax to be an important factor. It also noted that the Solicitor General
did submit a brief opposing worldwide formula apportionment in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., No. 81-349 (pending before the Court at that time). 103 S. Ct. at 2956
& n.33. The Court declined to speculate as to why no brief was submitted and stated that it had
received no indication that the views in Chicago Bridge still reflected the views of the Government, or that the brief in that case was applicable to Container. Chicago Bridge was subsequently dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 104 S. Ct. 542 (1984). Federal
preemption concerns, or concerns of conflict with international tax treaties were dismissed on
the ground that each nation is to formulate its own method of taxing domestic corporations.
Furthermore, Contatner was viewed as a taxation matter of local, not international concern. 103
S. Ct. at 2956. In regard to matters of state taxation, the Court noted that Congress had declined to enact uniform taxation. Id. at 2956 & n.32.
69 103 S. Ct. at 2956. The Court commented that even if foreign nations had an interest
in reducing the tax burden of domestic corporations, the fact remained that Container did owe
California some tax.

N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REC.

[VOL. 9

states by the tenth amendment. 70 This power is limited, however, by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7' A state tax on interstate commerce must thus undergo a due process analysis. It must "[be]
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, [be]
fairly apportioned, . . . not discriminate against interstate commerce,

and [be] fairly related to the services provided by the state. ' '72 In addition, when a state tax is upon instrumentalities of foreign commerce,
there are several constitutional considerations under the Commerce
Clause, including the need for federal uniformity in international affairs
and the avoidance of multiple taxation. 73 The tax in Container was attacked as both a violation of the Commerce Clause74 and as a violation
75
of due process.

I.

Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power
. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several
States .... 76 Thus, it has been held that if a state tax "creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, [or] prevents the Federal
Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating commercial
77
relations with foreign governments,"' it violates the Commerce Clause.
A.

Multiple Taxation

Taxation is the price paid by those engaged in interstate and foreign
commerce for benefits received from the taxing state.78 Multiple taxation is deemed unfair, however, because it creates a burden on interstate
commerce 79 to the advantage of intrastate commerce.8 0 While multiple
70 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
X.
71 "[Nlor shall any State deprive any persons of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ....
" U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72
japan Line, 441 U.S. at 444-45; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977); Washington Revenue Dept. v. Assoc. of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750
(1978).73
]apan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
74 Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2939-43.
75 Id
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
77
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.
78 Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Missouri State Tax Commission, 390 U.S. 317
(1968); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
79 Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 94 (1972); Central Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S.
607, 612 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-85 (1952); Ott v. Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311
(1938); Western Line Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255 (1938).
80 See Comment, Limitation on State Taxation ofForeign Commerce: The Contemporary Viahty of
the Hsome Port Doctrine, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 817, 828 (1979); Developments in the Law, FederalLtimiations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 965 (1962). See also Washington Revenue Dept. v. Assoc. of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978); Michelin Tire
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is
taxation is not per se violative of the Commerce Clause,"' a state's tax 82
unconstitutional if it exacts more than its "fair share" of tax revenue.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in several cases where the
tax at issue involved foreign commerce. In Japan Line 83 for example, the

Court held that California's ad valorem property tax on Japanese cargo
containers was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because it

represented multiple taxation in fact 8 4 and because it prevented the U.S.
Government from speaking with one voice in its relations with foreign
countries.8 5 Multiple taxation existed in Japan Line because Japan right-

fully 86 taxed the containers in full and California then taxed the containers in part.87 Japan Line was the first case to declare a state tax
unconstitutional because of the multiple tax burden it created on foreign

commerce.
Other cases in foreign commerce have involved the question of
whether the taxation by a state of dividends received by a parent corporation from its foreign subsidiary subjected the parent to multiple taxation.88 In each of these cases, the Court focused on whether a unitary
business existed.8 9 If a corporation and its subsidiaries constitute a unitary business 9° (assuming that the state tax passes all other constitutional
hurdles)9i then there exists a presumption that the state tax is accurate
92
and it may be applied to a proportionate share of the business income.
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, reh'g denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255 (1938).
The Supreme Court has admonished that interstate and foreign commerce must "pay their
own way," subject to the consideration that taxes bear a "fair relation" to benefits conferred.
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590, 600 (1954).
81 The Supreme Court inJapan Line appeared to set out a clear policy that if a state tax
results in multiple taxation of foreign commerce, it violates the commerce clause. Id at 446-52.
But the majority in Container stepped back from this clear policy to say that the tax in Container
was proper because it was not inevitable multiple taxation, as was the tax in Japan Line. 103 S.
Ct. at 2952. The Court also noted that forcing California to change its taxing scheme would
possibly not eliminate double taxation. Id. at 2954.
82 See, e.g., Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1930).
83 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
84 Id at 452. The Court said that there was multiple taxation in fact, in contrast to the
risk of multiple taxation, because Japan had the right to tax the containers in full.
85 Id
86 The containers were rightfully taxed in Japan because that was where they were owned,
registered, and based, and they were used exclusively in international commerce. Id at 451-52.
87 Id at 452.
88 ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (Idaho's tax of a
nondomiciliary parent corporation's receipt of dividends from its foreign subsidiaries was unconstitutional); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of the State of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 355 (1982) (New Mexico's tax of parent corporation on dividends received from
foreign subsidiaries was unconstitutional); Cf Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of
Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, (1980) (Vermont's tax on parent, N.Y. corporation's receipt of dividends from foreign subsidiaries upheld). See in/la notes 131-53 and accompanying text.
89 ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 322-24; Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 3134-39; Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439-40.
90 See in/ra notes 120-55 and accompanying text.
91 This reference is to hurdles under the due process clause. See supra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text.
92 See discussion in Note, in/fa note 107, at 126 & n.183.
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If, however, a corporation is found not to be a unitary business, then a
state tax on income of a corporation earned outside the state's borders is
93
unconstitutional.
B.

Federal Uniformity

The concern for federal uniformity, or that the federal government
"speak with one voice" when regulating areas that have foreign policy
implications 94 is a crucial one. In the area of foreign commerce, 9 5
"[e]ven a slight overlapping of tax - a problem that might be deemed de
mini'mi's in a domestic context - assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned."'96 Uniformity is crucial because of the disruption that a lack of uniformity
could cause in international relations, 97 and because of the possibility
98
that a nation could retaliate in a manner detrimental to U.S. interests.
In light of the importance of federal uniformity in matters affecting
foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has continued to maintain strict control over any state action that could hinder foreign relations. 99 For example, in Zschermzg v. Miler,1° ° an Oregon probate statute which
93 See, e.g., Mobil, 445 U.S. 425.
94 The Supreme Court has long held that matters affecting foreign affairs are exclusively
within the control of the federal government. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448 & n.13; Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, reh'g denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968); Board of Trustees of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Colley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299, 319 (1851).
95 The Supreme Court has followed the philosophy that the framers of the Constitution
intended for the scope of foreign commerce power to be greater than that of interstate commerce. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448 & n.13, and cases cited therein. For a discussion of this
philosophy, see Note, State Taxation oflnternationalAir Carriers, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 92, 101 and
n.42 (1962); Abel, The Commerce Clause in the ConstitutionalConvention and in Contemporapy Comment,
25 MINN.
L. REV. 432, 465-75 (1941).
96
japan Line, 441 U.S. at 456.
97 See discussion in Note, Japan Line, Ltd v. County of Los Angeles, The Foreign Commerce
Clause.- An Economic Approach to the Negative E ffects of State Taxation, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 793, 810
(1980). Nonuniformity in apportionment methods could create international disputes where
there is no authoritative tribunal to resolve them. Id
98 Retaliation by foreign nations disadvantaged by state actions is a concern expressed
frequently by the Solicitor General. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Solicitor General in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., No. 81-349 at 16 (citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876)). In Chy Lung, the Court stated that without a policy of federal
uniformity, "a single state [could], at her pleasure embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other
nations." 92 U.S. at 279.
There is also the concern that countries will retaliate by enacting tax laws harmful to U.S.
interests because many nations grant exemptions from taxation on the basis of reciprocity. See
discussion in Note, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, The Foreign Commerce Clause.- An
Economic Approach to the Negative Effects of State Taxation, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 753, 810-11 & nn.
120, 121 (1980).
99 But f Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, rehg denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976)
(Georgia's ad valorem property tax on inventory of imported tires upheld). The expected flood
of similar tax statutes did not materialize after the Michelih decision; see Hellerstein, Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages: Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 99 (1977).
100 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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provided that property would escheat when claimed by a nonresident
1
alien unless certain requirements were met was invalidated. 10 According to the Court, the requirements of the statute involved Oregon in foreign affairs "which the Constitution entrusts to the President and
Congress.' 1 2 In United States v. Belmont, 103 the Court upheld an international compact entered into between the U.S. and Soviet Governments
against contradictory interests held by a banker in New York. A Soviet
corporation had deposited money in a bank in New York and was subsequently dissolved by the Soviet Government which appropriated all of
its assets.' 0 4 Thereafter, the United States established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government and agreed to turn over the corporation's funds to the Soviets. The Court upheld the actions of the U.S.
Government, stating that "no state policy could prevail against the international compact."' 1 5 State laws and policies were viewed as10irrevelant
°6
to the "effective operation of a federal constitutional power.
The decision inJapanLine was also based in large part on a need for
federal uniformity. 10 7 The Court discerned a trend toward uniform
treatment of the containers at issue. 10 8 It held that the divergence of
California's taxing formula prevented the federal government from
speaking with one voice in international trade.' 0 9 Federal uniformity in
0
Thus,
matters affecting international trade was viewed as paramount. 11
the tax in Japan Line was unconstitutional because it violated this "one
voice" standard."'*

II.

Due Process

Generally, the states have been given broad discretion to tax corporate entities within their borders.1 1 2 In the exercise of that discretion,
several states have utilized separate accounting principles to compute an
intrastate corporation's tax.' 13 Under separate accounting, the precise
101Id at 430-32. These requirements were as follows: (1) a reciprocal right to take property under the same terms must be provided to U.S. citizens in the foreign country; (2) U.S.
citizens must have the right to receive payment in the United States from estates in the foreign
country; and (3) foreign heirs must have the right to receive money from the Oregon estates
without it being confiscated.
102 Id at 432-41.
103 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
104 Id at 326.
105Id at 327.
106 Id at 332.
107 103 S. Ct. at 448-51.
108 Id at 452.
109 Id at 453.

10 Id.at 451-54.
I' See alsoUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Colley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,
319 (1851).
112 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
113See discussion in Keesling, The Combined Report and Worldwide Businesses, 60 TAXES 304,

304-05 (1982).
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geographical source of a corporation's profits is determined and the corporation is taxed on the income earned in that particular state or geographic area. 1 4 Although this method produces a satisfactory result
when activities carried on within a state are truly separate from any business conducted outside the state," 15 a substantial amount of revenue can
be garnered from corporations operating in both interstate and foreign
commerce. 1 6 These multistate and multinational corporations create a
problem in tax computation because when the individual subsidiaries are
interdependent, an accurate measurement of taxable income through
utilization of separate accounting methods is difficult.' 1 7 Interdependence of business activities, in and out of a state, creates a unitary business" l8 which is taxed using formula apportionment methods. 119
A.

Unitay Business Princip/e

What constitutes a unitary business has been and continues to be
A unitary
the subject of considerable controversy and confusion. 120
business has been defined as one in which "the operation of the portion
of the business within the state is dependent upon or contributory to the
operation of the business outside the state."''2 It has also been described
as "either . . . an interstate business which is so integrated as to make
separate accounting for the in-state business impossible, or . . . an interstate business in which the in-state activities contribute to the out-of-state
business and the out-of-state activities contribute to the in-state busi114 Id See also Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
115 See Keesling,supra note 113, at 304-05; Palestin, Interstate Taxation. Non-Unitary Corporation
Statutor Apportionment )ield to Separate Accounting?, 1965 PROCS. NAT. TAX A. 531.
116 See comments of Senator Church on the impact that interstate revenues would have on

-Should

California's economy; Church, Senator Church on Unitary Taxation, 11 TAX NOTES 6, 6 (1980).
The taxation of interstate and foreign commerce has met with much approval by the states and
the courts due to a belief that interstate commerce should "pay its own way." See Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276
(1976). According to the Supreme Court, the tax on interstate commerce is the price paid for
benefits received. See Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 289. See also Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458-62 (1959). Cf Developments in the Law, FederalLimitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953 (1962).
117 See Keesling, supra note 113, 304-05; Note, The Unitary Tax Method- Are the Factors Used by
California in the Determinationof Unity Still Viable After ASARCO and Woolworth', 15 PAC. L.J.
109, 113 (1983); Palestin,supra note 115; Rudolph, State Taxation of InterstateBusiness.- The Unitary
Business Concept and Afiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REV. 171, 191-92 (1970).
118 See infra notes 120-55 and accompanying text.
119 See infra notes 156-98 and accompanying text.
120 For a discussion of the unitary business principle and its application, see, e.g., G. ALTMAN and F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION (2d ed. 1950); Dexter,
Tax Apportionment of the Income of a Unitag Business and an Examination of Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 1981 B.Y.U.L. REV. 107; Hellerstein, Recent Developments in
State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscriptionof Unitary Business, 21 NATIONAL TAX J. 487 (1968);
Keesling, The Impact of the Mobil Case on Apportionment of Income, 1981 B.Y.U.L. REV. 87; Keesling and Warren, supra note 32; Rudolph, supra note 107; Surrey, Reflections on the Allocation of
Income and Expenses Among National Tax Jurisdictions, 10 HARV. J. L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 409
(1978); Note, supra note 117.
121 ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 120, at 110.
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is of particular importance because the

Supreme Court views the unitary business principle as "the linchpin of
apportionability in the field of state income taxation .... ,"123 Thus,
while a state tax must pass muster under the due process clause, 24 a
court's finding that a corporation and its subsidiaries constitute a unitary
business includes a finding that the state tax was applied to a corporation
that has a nexus with the taxing state and benefits from services provided
by the state.' 25 The state tax is presumed valid and the burden shifts to
the corporation to prove that the income at issue was earned in activities
126
outside the unitary business.
In practice, the Supreme Court's application of the unitary business
principle appears somewhat haphazard. Businesses do not have to be
entirely separate to qualify as non-unitary. 127 The Court has declined,
however, to detail precisely what factors constitute a unitary business
and how much weight each factor will carry.' 28 Early cases turned upon
the fact that the taxpayer had the burden of overcoming the presumption that a state's method of taxation produced an unfair result.' 29 Formulations of the present-day unitary business principle were present in
30
early cases but the concept was far from clear.'
In recent cases the taxpayer's difficulty with the burden of proof
continues, but a more concrete formulation of the factors to be considered in determining whether a unitary business exists is beginning to appear. The Supreme Court's decisions appear to indicate that functional
integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale are
several of the factors which belie a unitary business. In Mobil Oil Corporalion v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 13 1 the Court held that Mobil, an
integrated petroleum corporation with businesses in forty states (including Vermont), the District of Columbia, and several foreign countries
was a unitary business.' 32 Vermont could tax a proportionate share of
122 Rudolph, supra note 117, at 184.
123 Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439.
124 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
125See, e.g., Mobtl, 445 U.S. 425; Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev., 447 U.S. 207
(1980).
126 See Seago, The Revrialzation of the Unitayy Business Principle -

ASARCO and Woolworth,

I J. ST. TAX'N 101 (1982); F.W. Woolworth v. Taxation and Revenue Department of New
Mexico, 458 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1981).
127 Seago, supra note 126, at 104 n.15 and material cited therein.
128 See, e.g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920) (Connecticut's tax on corporation organized in Delaware with manufacturing operations in Connecticut and sales in other states upheld); Bass Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission,
266 U.S. 271, 283-84 (1924) (New York tax on corporation with offices in New York and Chicago, manufacturing in England, and sales in United States upheld); Cf Hans Rees' Sons, Inc.
v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 132-34 (1930) (North Carolina tax on corporation organized in
New York with only 1% of sales in N.C. and 47% of income taxable in N.C. was
unconstitutional).
129 Underwood, 254 U.S. at 120; Bass, 266 U.S. at 282; Hans Rees'Sons, 283 U.S. at 126-27.
130 See, e.g., Underwood, 254 U.S. 113.
131 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
132 Id. at 438-42.

N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

(VOL.

9

Mobil's foreign source income, ie., dividends received by Mobil from its
foreign subsidiary, unless Mobil could prove that the dividends were
earned in activites unrelated to the corporation's sale of petroleum products. 133 Mobil was unable to carry this burden. Thus, Vermont was allowed to tax the dividends received by Mobil, the parent of a
134
"functionally integrated enterprise."'
Functional integration was again the focus in Exxon Corporation v.
Wisconsin Department of Revenue.' 35 Exxon, also an integrated petroleum
company engaged in exploration, production, refining, and marketing, 1 3 6 sought to utilize separate accounting 137 with its marketing operations which were conducted solely in Wisconsin. The Court held that
Exxon had failed to carry its burden of showing that its functional departments were discrete business enterprises. 138 Accordingly, Wisconsin
139
was allowed to tax a proportionate share of Exxon's total income.
Some guidance was provided by the Court concerning what is not a
unitary business in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 14 0 and in
F W. Woolworth Company v. Taxation and Revenue Department of New Mexico.141 Both cases involved the apportionment of dividends received by a
parent from its foreign subsidiary. In ASARCO, the taxpayer was en142
gaged in the mining, smelting, and refining of nonferrous metals.
Substantial evidence 43 was presented by ASARCO that its subsidiaries
133 Id at 440. The Court noted that Mobil did not contest the fact that it was a unitary
business and in fact regularly submitted tax returns combining all its operating income without
regard to location. Id.at 437.
134Id.at 440.
135447 U.S. 207 (1980).

136 d at 211L

137See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
138 447 U.S. at 224.
139 Id at 230.

140 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
141458 U.S. 355 (1982). ASARCO and Woolworth have already been subject to much critical comment and discussion. See, e.g., Seago, supra note 126; Note, supra note 117.
142458 U.S. at 309.
"43 This suit involved five foreign subsidiaries: M.I.M. Holdings, Ltd.; General Cable
Corp.; Revere Copper and Brass, Inc.; ASARCO Mexicana, S.A.; and Southern Peru Copper
Corp. Id.at 309. M.I.M. was viewed by the Court as an investment by ASARCO. Id.at 323.
M.I.M. sold only 1% of its output to ASARCO at market rates. ASARCO owns 52.7% of
M.I.M.'s stock, but M.I.M. chooses its own officers and directors and otherwise maintains minimal contact with ASARCO. Id at 322-23. ASARCO owns approximately one-third interests
in General Cable and Revere Copper. In regard to these subsidiaries, ASARCO consented to
an antitrust decree that prohibits it from voting its stock held in them, from maintaining common officers in them, from acquiring stock in any other copper fabricators, or from selling
copper to them at prices lower than those quoted to their competitors. ASARCO has no contact with these companies in regard to management or operational decisions. Id at 323-24.
Mexicana was originally owned wholly by ASARCO but Mexican law forced them to divest
themselves of 51% of their holdings. The Court did not disturb the state court's finding that
Mexicana operated independently of ASARCO. Id at 324. ASARCO held 51.5% of Southern
Peru's stock. Id at 320. Southern Peru sold 35% of its output to ASARCO. Id.at 321. The
state court found that ASARCO had the potential to control Southern Peru but that Southern
Peru's remaining three shareholders refused to participate in Southern Peru unless assured that
they would not be dominated by ASARCO. Thus, the parties entered into a management
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were separate entities, not controlled by ASARCO. 14 4 The subsidiaries
selected their own officers and boards of directors, 45 and any services
provided to the subsidiaries by ASARCO were provided at the same rate
paid by other companies. 146 The Court concluded that ASARCO and
its subsidiaries were "insufficiently connected" to permit a finding of a
47
unitary business. 1
In Woolworth the taxpayer was engaged in retail sales with chains of
stores located throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands.' 48 In holding that Woolworth's subsidiaries were not part of a
unitary business, 149 the Court was influenced by testimony that each
subsidiary acted autonomously in its selection of a store site, its advertising, and its control. 150 The Court found no evidence of economies of
15 1
scale due to centralized purchasing, manufacturing, or warehousing.
Moreover, each subsidiary had control of its own management and employment decisions. 152 Thus, the decision in Woolworth was reached after a careful examination of the actual practices of the subsidiaries, not
just speculation as to the mere potential of Woolworth and its subsidiaries to be a unitary business - which was the legal standard applied by
53
the state court.'
Despite all of this recent litigation, the contours of the unitary business principle are still difficult to define and the Supreme Court is the
first to admit this, stating in Container "that [the unitary business principle] is not, so to speak, unitary: There are variations on the theme, and
any number of them are logically consistent with the underlying principles motivating the approach."' 154 This creates a problem which is readily apparent to the taxpayer who seeks to refute the contention that his
corporation is a unitary business in order to rebut the presumption that
the method of formula apportionment used by a taxing state is
correct. 155
B.

Formula Apportzonment Methods

Methods of formula apportionment

56

utilized by the states to tax

contract which insures, by voting requirements and shareholder selection, that ASARCO cannot control Southern Peru. Id at 321-22.
144 458 U.S. at 320-24.
145Id at 323.
146 See, e.g., id at 323 n.18.
147 458 U.S. at 322.
148 458 U.S. at 356.
149 Id at369.
150 Id. at 365.
151Id.
152 Id at 366-67.
153Id.at 363.
154 103 S. Ct. at 2941.
155 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
156 Taxation by formula apportionment involves making a rough approximation of the
corporate income that is reasonably related to the corporation's activities within the taxing
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corporations engaged in interstate and foreign commerce vary from one
to three factor formulas using a combination of sales or gross receipts,
payroll, manufacturing costs, and tangible property.157 States also use
varying definitions' 58 of the above items. For example, a sale may be
defined either as occurring at the place of business where orders are
placed, or at the sale's destination.159 The diversity of formulas and
definitions has created considerable confusion and often results in multiple, 160 or even under-taxation.161
For many years, the Supreme Court did little to lessen or to control
the increasing power of the states to tax interstate commerce. 162 Faced
with a diversity of formulas, it upheld them by default because the taxpayers failed to meet their burden of showing that the formula used by
the taxing state was in error. 163 Formula apportionment methods generally met with the Court's approval because they resolved the conflict between the desire to have instrumentalities of interstate commerce pay
their own way and the principle that interstate commerce should not be
64
burdened with multiple taxation.1
In one of its first decisions on formula apportionment, Underwood
ypewrier Company v. Chamberlain ,165 the Court upheld Connecticut's
crude, single-factor formula based upon the proportion of tangible property owned by the corporation within the taxing state. 16 6 The taxpayer
conducted its manufacturing in Connecticut and had branch offices and
state. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bain, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978). Formula apportionment methods
have been examined and criticized by many sources. See, e.g., G, ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, supra
note 120, at 97-102; Cohen, State Tax Allocations and Formulas Whir/i Aect Management Operating
Decisions, 1 J. OF TAX'N 7 (July 1954); Corrigan, Uniforinioty in Interstate Taxation, 13 TAX NOTES
200, 200 (1981); Dexter, supra note 120; Hellerstein, supra note 120, at 489; R. POSNER, ECoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 515-16 (2d ed. 1977); Palestin, supra note 115, at 531.
157 Cohen, supra note 156 at 4. Cohen provides examples of how various formulas work. Id
at 4-5.
158 Id at 8-12.
159 Id at 8-10; see also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SUBiCOMMirTE ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th

Cong. 2d Sess. (1964) (provides a detailed discussion of the various positions on taxation of
multistate and multinational corporations, discussing the various formulas and definitions
used).
160 See R. POSNER, supra note 156, at 515-16. Dexter, supra note 120, at 402-03, gives an
example of how a corporation's intangibles could theoretically be subject to "quintuple taxation," by being taxed in: 1) state of incorporation; 2) principal place of business; 3) place where
stock has business situs; 4) all states where it has income; and 5) all states that protect the
corporation's intangibles.
161 Dexter, supra note 120, at 403 n.8, discusses the fact that formulas may result in some
income not being taxed. This income is called "nowhere income." Id. Further discussion of
nowhere income can be found in Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation-Recent Revolution
and a Modem Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423, 426 (1976); Hellerstein, State Taxation and the
Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335, 341 (1976).
162 See discussion in Hellerstein, supra note 120, at 489.
163 See, e.g., Underwood, 254 U.S, 113; Bass, 266 U.S. 271.
164 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska Board of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590,
598 (1954).
165 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
66
1 1d at 121.
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sales in many other states.16 7 Connecticut taxed forty-seven percent of
the taxpayer's income, the percentage of real estate and tangible personal
property owned by the taxpayer within the state. 168 The Court stated
method of taxathat Underwood had failed to show that Connecticut's
69
tion was inherently arbitrary or unreasonable. 1
Thereafter, until its decision in General Motors v. District of Columbia,1 70 the Court exhibited an attitude of almost total acceptance of state
taxing formulas.171 In General Motors, however, it struck down a singlefactor sales formula holding that it was defective because it attributed
income to the District of Columbia from outside sources.' 7 2 General Motors sold cars in the District of Columbia but did no manufacturing
there.' 73 In comparing the single-factor sales formula to three-factor formulas (which the Court said were used by most jurisdictions), the Court
stated that the single-factor formula was inconsistent and would result in
multiple taxation because it would tax fully what a three-factor formula
174
taxes in part.
Since General Motors, the Court has conducted a more thorough examination of state taxing formulas, studying the corporations involved to

discern whether a unitary business exists and whether the state taxing
formulas conform with due process. 175 It has been argued that the
Court's actions constitute a response to the growing criticism of its earlier
76
decisions which increased states' powers to tax intrastate commerce. 1
In Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont,

77

and Ex-

167 Id. at 119.
168 Id. Underwood stated only that it received $43,000.00 of net profits in Connecticut and

$1,300,000.00 in the rest of the states where it sold its products. The Court noted, however, that
this did not deal with the fact that all monies were earned in transactions that started in Connecticut. Id.
169 Id. at 121.

170 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
171 Cf Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
172 380 U.S. at 555. The Court also expressed its approval of three-factor formulas. Id. at
559-60.
173 Id. at 559-60.
174 Id. at 661. The Court stated that "[tihe great majority of states imposing corporate

income taxes apportion the total income of a corporation by application of a three-factor
formula which gives equal weight to the geographical distribution of plant, payroll, and sales."
175 See, e.g., Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972) (Court found state tax on tangible personal
property of taxpayer engaged in out-of-state sales, and not services, was unfair burden on interstate commerce); Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Missouri State Tax Commission, 390

U.S. 317, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 1046 (1968) (mileage formula used by Missouri to tax railroad
resulted in gross overreaching).

176 Hellerstein, supra note 120, at 495. Hellerstein also suggests that the Court was influenced by the quick passage of Pub. L. No. 86-272, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1959)), which
provided that a state had no jurisdiction to tax a corporation whose only activity within its

borders was the solicitation of orders accepted out-of-state and filled by shipment from a point
out-of-state. Businesses were quick to seek passage of Pub. L. No. 86-272 when the Supreme
Court approved the taxation of a corporation whose only activities within the taxing state were
those now set out in Pub. L. No. 86-272 as nontaxable. Northwestern States Portland Cement
Co. v. State of Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
177 445 U.S. 1223 (1980).
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xon Corporationv. Wisconstn Dept. of Revenue ,l 78 the Court upheld the threefactor apportionment formulas of Vermont and Wisconsin. In both
cases, the Court found that a unitary business existed. This finding created a presumption that the state's taxing formula was accurate, which
shifted to the taxpayer the difficult burden of proving that the income at
issue was earned in activities unrelated to the unitary business.' 79 Being
unable to carry this burden, the taxpayers were taxed on a proportion of
their income. 180

Although the Supreme Court has expressed a preference for the
three-factor apportionment formula which it approved in General Motors,' 8 1 Butler Brothers v. McColgan,' 2 and most recently in Container,18 3 it
has, on occasion, upheld even a single-factor formula.'8 4 Other sources
have also voiced approval for a three-factor formula,1 8 5 although congressional proposals favor a two-factor approach. 8 6 Thus, while the
three-factor formula may be the most prevalent one in use, there is still
considerable diversity in state taxation formulas.
The decision in Container ignores the continuing concern expressed
by businesses 18 7 and foreign governments' 88 over the lack of uniformity
in state apportionment methods and the elusiveness of the unitary business principle. Congressional proposals for uniform legislation have
failed,' 89 however, and local efforts by the states themselves have fallen
short of the needed support' 9° and have been subject to constitutional
attack. 191

In Container, the Court recognized that California's three-factor
178 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
'79 Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439; Exxon, 447 U.S. at 223.
180 Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439.

181 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
182 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
183 103 S. Ct. at 2949. The Court stated that "[t]he three-factor formula used by California
has gained wide approval precisely because payroll, property, and sales appear in combination
to reflect a very large share of the activities by which value is generated. It is therefore able to
avoid the sorts of distortions [of apportioning between 66% and 85% of the taxpayer's income to
the taxing state by utilizing a single-factor formula based entirely on ownership of tangible
property] that were present in Hans Rees' Sons. "
184 See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1929) (Court upheld Iowa singlefactor sales formula which attributed portion of income to state which gross sales made within
the state bore to total gross sales).
185 See, e.g., Keesling, supra note 113, at 306.
186 See Rudolph, supra note 117, at 174-75, discussing H.R. 11798, which proposed a uniform two-factor formula. The bill failed. Cf Hellerstein, Allocation Nexus in State Taxation of
Interstate Business, 20 TAx L. REV. 259 (1964).
187 See supra note 176.
188 See infra note 219-20 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
190 A uniform method of taxation and a procedure for arbitration of disputes has been
adopted by 22 states. This procedure is called the Multistate Tax Compact. Note, State Taxation
of Interstate Businesses and the Multistate Tax Compact. The Search for a Delicate Uniformity, II

COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROS. 231 (1975).
'9'

Id at 247-54.
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192
For
formula using sales, property, and payroll has its imperfections.
1 93
and the factors
example, the weight given to each factor is arbitrary,
can be manipulated to give more weight to those factors that will generate more revenue for the taxing state.194 There are also the previously
discussed problems of differing definitions of factors, and multiple or
even under-taxation. 9 5 The Court approved California's formula, however, because it viewed the three-factor formula as widely accepted, and
because it felt that the factors used by California "reflect[ed] a very large
share of the activities by which value is generated."' 96 The reason the
three-factor formula is so widely accepted may be that states realize the
revenue it can generate.' 9 7 Unfortunately, no thorough analysis of the
effects of the three-factor formula has been made. In both Container and
in Japan Line, however, California's three-factor formula resulted in

double taxation.' 98
The unitary business principle, also relied upon by the Court in
reaching its decision in Container, was described by the Court itself as
"not . . . unitary."' 99 The Court has discussed various factors it examines to determine whether a unitary business exists, e.g., centralization of
management, functional integration, or economies of scale, but it has
provided little guidance as to its application of these factors or the weight
to be given each factor.20 0 In fact, a corporation can have some unitary
20
factors and still not qualify as a unitary business. ' At some undefined
point, 20 2 the Court simply finds sufficient evidence to conclude that a
unitary business exists. 20 3 Container was held to be a unitary business
20 4
despite considerable evidence that its subsidiaries were autonomous,
and despite charges that the stipulations of fact relied upon by the state
20 5
court as unitary factors were misinterpreted.
192103 S. Ct. at 2949.
193Id.at 2949 & n.20.
194 McClure, Toward Uniformity in Interstate Taxation. A FurtherAnalysis, 13 TAX NOTEs 51,
51 & n.1 (1981).
195 See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
196 103 S. Ct. at 2949.
197 See 136 Daily Tax Reports G-5-G-61 (July 14, 1983) (discussing Florida's enactment of
a statute similar to California's statute in Container. The statute is expected to raise about $95
million annually and is to be used to upgrade Florida's education system).
198 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
199 103 S. Ct. at 2941.
200 See, e.g., Woolworth, 458 S. Ct. at 136-38. See also the table in Seago, supra note 127, at
117, detailing the unitary business factors set forth in Woolworth.
201 See supra note 127.
202 Seago, supra note 127, at 116.
203 One author suggests that the Container decision represents a tax break for multinational
corporations that can alter their corporate structure turning foreign corporations into passive
investments and thus providing protection from state taxation. See WhiteNack, State litaton
After the Container Decision, 20 TAX NOTES 771, 783 (Sept. 5, 1983).
204 103 S. Ct. at 2943-44. See WhiteNack, supra note 203, at 772-73 for a comparison of the
unitary v. non-unitary findings by the Court in Container.
205 See Peters, Supreme Ct. in Container, Upholds State'r Broad Power Under Unitaqy Taxation
Method, 57 J. TAX'N 300, 305 (1983).
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The Court's treatment of the Commerce Clause issues in Container is
also disturbing. The Court makes light of the fact that the California
taxing scheme has resulted in double taxation, 20 6 and distinguishes the
double tax in Container from the unconstitutional double tax in Japan
Line, arguing that in Japan Line the double tax is inevitable. 20 7 The
dissent disputes this, pointing out that double taxation will always be
inevitable under California's divergent taxing method because of the
weight given to the factors in its formula.2 0 8 The dissent also criticizes
California's three-factor formula by pointing out that it has no relationship to the amount of income earned in a specific area because a higher
proportion of income is allocated to areas with higher wage rates, property values and sales. 20 9 Although Container's subsidiaries earned more
money than it did, more income was attributed to Container because
2 10
California wages, property values, and sales costs are higher.
Also disturbing is the Court's dismissal of the possible foreign policy
implications of its decision. It prefaced its discussion with the remark
that "[tlhis Court has little competence in determining precisely when
foreign nations will be offended by particular acts, and even less competence in deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against
the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as
they please."'2 11 The Court then proceeded to find no indication that the
Solicitor General is against the application of the unitary business principle and the formula apportionment method in Container.2 12 The Court
ignored a memorandum pending before it in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v.
CaterpillarTractor Co. ,213 a case dealing with the same issue. In the memorandum, the Solicitor General states that "the imposition of [a state tax]
on the apportioned combined worldwide business income of a unitary
group of related corporations, impairs federal uniformity in an area
where such uniformity is essential.12 1 4 Refusing to rely on the Government's position in Chicago Bridge as indicative of the Government's stance
in Container, the Court instead inexplicably assumed that the Govern2 15
ment had changed its viewpoint since Chicago Bridge.
The possibility that any impact from its decision will be felt by foreign parties was similarly dismissed. 21 6 The Court regarded the matter
in Container as a local concern, 2 17 stating that the tax in Container is on a
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

103 S. Ct. at 2952.
Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id
See

at 2957-58.

at 2955.
at 2956-57.
supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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domestic corporation and, therefore, foreign interests should not be concerned. 21 8 The fact that subsidiaries located in a foreign country were
being taxed was disregarded.
Foreign countries upset by the Container decision can retaliate with
taxing measures that would be detrimental to U.S. interests. In fact,
such retaliatory measures were discussed in letters submitted by Canada,
France, the United Kingdom, and others, to protest the states' use of
formula apportionment measures. 21 9 Even if foreign governments agree
that Container is an American concern (since it has been found to be a
unitary business), they may still be concerned that220such a tax will discourage American investment in foreign countries.
The decision in Contatner can perhaps be explained as a reaction to
the criticism of Japan Line. After Japan Ltne, there were concerns that
the costs of foreign commerce would be shouldered by local taxpayers. 2 2'
Although the Court in Japan Line destroyed a potential source of revenue
for the states, a vast source of potential state revenue was opened up in
Contatner. This fact was immediately apparent to Florida, 222 which enacted a statute that essentially duplicates California's statute in order to
get its share of revenue from multinational corporations.
The Container decision illuminates the need for a central coordinating authority or some form of uniform legislation to guide the states in
taxing multistate and multinational corporations. A common formula
apportionment method with uniform definitions is needed. More clearcut guidelines must be formulated concerning what constitutes a unitary
business. A tribunal to settle multiple taxation problems would also be
helpful. Local efforts by the states have not solved the problem, and the
Supreme Court cannot manage the difficult task of studying and assessing all possible contingencies. 22 3 The task belongs to Congress.
With its decision in Contatner the Supreme Court chose to act in an
area where action is needed. 224 The Court has done little, however, to
clear up the confusion that surrounds the unitary business principle and
its application, or to provide uniformity in state apportionment formulas. The Contai'ner decision gives states the opportunity to obtain vast
amounts of revenue by taxing multinational corporations according to
the "Court-approved" California apportionment method. Unfortunately, it may also create disputes in the international business world.
218 Id
219 Id. at 2960 & n.4.
220 The dissent comments on this possibility in Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2959.
221 See Note, supra note 117, at 808.
222 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
223 The Court also indicates that it will begin to be very selective about what cases it will
hear in regard to whether a finding of a unitary business was proper. 103 S. Ct. at 2946 & n.14.
224 The Container decision has been criticized for not going far enough. WhiteNack, supra
note 203, at 779-82 argues that the Supreme Court could have avoided future needless litigation
by stating what actions invoke the prohibition of the commerce clause.
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Uniformity is needed in this area. Perhaps the Court, with its action,
will persuade others to act.
-CATHY

M.

RUDISILL

